11 Dec 10
Originally posted by PalynkaHi Palynka!
Hi beetle,
What is this tetralemma that you keep referencing? I couldn't find it on this thread.
With my seventh post at the fourth page of this thread I used a version of Nagarjuna's tetralemma in order to describe the nature of the quantum particle.
Nagarjuna's tetralemma (Everything is real and not real, both real and not real, neither real nor not real) and its differ variations are used by the Madhyamikas (by the Madhyamaka philosophers) in many ways, according to the specific points that must be made in the context of specific debates regarding the nature of the reality. For example, Bhavaviveka said that "...the nature of the reality is neither existent, nor non-existent, nor both existent and non-existent, nor neither", whilst Asvagosha was teaching that "...phenomena the way they appear and resound are neither established or real the way we perceive them", etc etc.
Nagarjuna offered his tetralemma in order to establish a solid access to the core Buddhist doctrine about sunyata (shunyata/ void/ emptiness: all phenomena are mind-dependent and lack of own being). The tetralemma is related to the extremes of the existence and it describes accuretely the concept of emptiness (the nature of the fundamental ground of reality).
Well, methinks the reality of the quantum realm and of the nature of the quantum particle are perfectly described by the tetralemma
😵
20 Dec 10
Originally posted by black beetleAvi Sion puts forth here,
Hi Palynka!
With my seventh post at the fourth page of this thread I used a version of Nagarjuna's tetralemma in order to describe the nature of the quantum particle.
Nagarjuna's tetralemma (Everything is real and not real, both real and not real, neither real nor not real) and its differ variations are used by the Madhyamikas (by the Madhyamaka phi ...[text shortened]... lm and of the nature of the quantum particle are perfectly described by the tetralemma
😵
http://www.thelogician.net/3b_buddhist_illogic/3b_chapter_01.htm
an argument against Nagarjuna's Tetralemma, and what Sion calls "Buddhist Illogic".
I am definitely no skilled logician, but the page does make some good points (as far as I can comprehend them), particularly the closing point about Nagarjuna appealing to our sense of logic to undermine it.
In it, he concludes the following;
"This property of symbols is evident throughout the science of formal logic, and it is here totally ignored by Nagarjuna. His motive of course was to verbalize and rationalize the Buddha’s doctrine that the ultimate truth is beyond nama and rupa, name and form (i.e. discrimination and discourse), knowable only by a transcendental consciousness (the Twofold Truth doctrine). More precisely, as Cheng emphasizes, Nagarjuna’s intent was to show that logic is inherently inconsistent and thus that reason is confused madness to be rejected. That is, he was (here and throughout) not ultimately trying to defend a tetralemma with B equal to A – or even to affirm that things are both A and non-A, or neither A nor non-A – but wished to get us to look altogether beyond the distinctions of conceptualization and the judgments of logic.
But as above shown he does not succeed in this quest. For his critique depends on a misrepresentation of logical science. He claims to show that logic is confused and self-contradictory, but in truth what he presents as the thesis of logical science is not what it claims for itself but precisely what it explicitly forbids. Furthermore, suppose logical theory did lead to contradictions as he claims, this fact would not lead us to its rejection were there not also a tacit appeal to our preference for the logical in practice. If logic were false, contradictions would be acceptable. Thus, funnily enough, Nagarjuna appeals to our logical habit in his very recommendation to us to ignore logic. In sum, though he gives the illusion that it is reasonable to abandon reason, it is easy to see that his conclusion is foregone and his means are faulty."
*****
Mmmm. Interesting. My view is that it is language itself, prior to logic, and being inherently dualistic and differentiating that limits our ability to express the non-dual underlying nature
The analogy of the holographic-like Holos is equally difficult to pin down it seems.
Where is the border of "being" or "non-being" therein?
20 Dec 10
Originally posted by TaomanAvi Sion is confused.
Avi Sion puts forth here,
http://www.thelogician.net/3b_buddhist_illogic/3b_chapter_01.htm
an argument against Nagarjuna's Tetralemma, and what Sion calls "Buddhist Illogic".
I am definitely no skilled logician, but the page does make some good points (as far as I can comprehend them), particularly the closing point about Nagarjuna appealing to our ...[text shortened]... difficult to pin down it seems.
Where is the border of "being" or "non-being" therein?
The basic tetralemma is:
1. The self is neither existent (The self is neither "A" )
2. nor non-existent (The self is nor "non-A” )
3. nor both existent and non-existent (The self is neither “A and non-A” )
4. nor neither (The self is nor “not A and not non-A” )
Regarding the border of "being" and of "non-being", methinks the answer is hidden in the veil of the quantum potential of the manifestation of the manifestations
😵
21 Dec 10
1 edit
Originally posted by black beetleBut he appears to be saying the same. What is the confusion?
Avi Sion is confused.
The basic tetralemma is:
1. The self is neither existent (The self is neither "A" )
2. nor non-existent (The self is nor "non-A” )
3. nor both existent and non-existent (The self is neither “A and non-A” )
4. nor neither (The self is nor “not A and not non-A” )
Regarding the border of "being" and of "non-being", methinks ...[text shortened]... idden in the veil of the quantum potential of the manifestation of the manifestations
😵
I don't finally agree with his position, because a premise (the ground premise) sidesteps the primary non-dilemma of non-duality. (Non-dilemma in the sense of "being unable to be expressed" ) It is fascinating because the whole discussion is describing the primary origins of the split between Western and Eastern understandings of the nature of reality.
I find it it is one of the strongest arguments I have encountered against the esteemed Nagarjuna, and to call it "confused" appears precipitate.
He states:
"The tetralemma[2] is a derivative of the laws of thought, with reference to any two terms or propositions, labeled A and B, and their opposites non-A and non-B. Four combinations of these four terms are conceivable, namely “A and B” (both), “non-A and non-B” (neither), “A and non-B” and “non-A and B” (one or the other only). According to Aristotelian logic, these four statements are incompatible with each other (only one of them can be true, because if two or more were affirmed then “A and non-A” or “B and non-B” or both would be true, and the latter implications are self-contradictory) and exhaustive (at least one of them must be true, since if they were all denied then “not A and not non-A” or “not B and not non-B” or both would be true, and the latter implications go against the excluded middle).
Now, what Nagarjuna does is insert the term A in place of B (i.e. he takes the case of B = A), and effectively claim that the above four logical possibilities of combination apply in that special case – so that “A and A (=B)”, “non-A and non-A (=non-B)”, “A and non-A (=non-B)”, “non-A and A (=B)” seem logically acceptable. He then goes on to argue that there are four existential possibilities: affirmation of A (A + A = A), denial of A (non-A + non-A = non-A), both affirmation and denial of A (A and non-A) and neither affirmation nor denial of A (not A and not non-A). He is thus apparently using the principles and terminology of common logic to arrive at a very opposite result. This gives him and readers the impression that it is quite reasonable to both affirm and deny or to neither affirm nor deny.
But in Aristotelian logic, the latter two alternatives are at the outset excluded – “both A and non-A” by the Law of Non-contradiction and “neither A nor non-A” by the Law of the Excluded-Middle – and the only logical possibilities left are “A” or “non-A”. The anti-Aristotelian position may be viewed, in a positive light, as an anti-Nominalist position, reminding us that things are never quite what they seem or that things cannot be precisely classified or labeled. But ultimately, they intend the death of Logic; for without the laws of thought, how are we to distinguish between true and false judgments?"
21 Dec 10
1 edit
Originally posted by TaomanSo this is ultimately a kind of hysterical slippery slope argument -- "Nagarjuna wants to murder Logic!!!" But Sion only succeeds in showing that Nagarjuna wriggles out of Aristotle's net.
"But ultimately, they intend the death of Logic; for without the laws of thought, how are we to distinguish between true and false judgments?"
Nagarjuna's Catuskoti is similar to the four-fold indeterminism of (Greek) Pyrrhonism. It functions as an anti-reification device.
21 Dec 10
Originally posted by TaomanNagarjuna doesn’t use the Aristotlean approach -Mulamadhyamakakarika is not based on the Western but on the classical Indian logic. In the Western logical traditions there are two main possibilities in an argument, truth or falsity, although a Western logician will often try to prove another truth through negation.
But he appears to be saying the same. What is the confusion?
I don't finally agree with his position, because a premise (the ground premise) sidesteps the primary non-dilemma of non-duality. (Non-dilemma in the sense of "being unable to be expressed" ) It is fascinating because the whole discussion is describing the primary origins of the split between W ...[text shortened]... without the laws of thought, how are we to distinguish between true and false judgments?"
However, Indian traditions use four positions: true (accurate, not false), not true (inaccurate, false), both true and not true, and neither true nor not true. This is the shape of the common Indian prasanga (tetralemma). And Nagarjuna goes deeper that this.
Obviously, our Avi Sion is confused big time due to the fact that the prasanga argumentation is a completely different line of reasoning than the Aristotlean argumentation. Sion claims that Nagarjuna is using four combinations of the Aristotlean four terms that are conceivable as “namely “A and B” (both), “non-A and non-B” (neither), “A and non-B” and “non-A and B” (one or the other only) ”, but this is not the case. Nagarjuna is using four negations (1: Non-A, 2: non Non-A, 3: non both Non-A And non Non-A, 4: neither Non-A and not Non-A), leaving Sion with nowhere to go and with nothing positive to grasp. Nagarjuna’s prasanga is not “…a derivative of the laws of thought with reference to any terms or propositions, labelled A and B, and their opposites non-A and non-B”, as Sion claims. Nagarjuna enters negation in full because he wants to negate all the viewpoints, and not because he wants to promote as “absolute truth” a specific viewpoint! All in all, Nagarjuna says:
“The colour of my foal is neither red
nor black
nor both red and black
nor neither”
and of course everybody understands that Nagarjuna’s foal has a different colour that is not declared; but our Avi Sion screams that “...according to the Aristotlean logic these four statements are incompatible with each other blah blah blah”, oh the horror
😵
21 Dec 10
Originally posted by Bosse de NageComment, you lazy, comment😵
So this is ultimately a kind of hysterical slippery slope argument -- "Nagarjuna wants to murder Logic!!!" But Sion only succeeds in showing that Nagarjuna wriggles out of Aristotle's net.
Nagarjuna's Catuskoti is similar to the four-fold indeterminism of (Greek) Pyrrhonism. It functions as an anti-reification device.
- Joined
- 18 Jan 07
- Moves
- 12469
21 Dec 10
Originally posted by black beetleErm... if your foal is another colour than red or black, it is 4. neither red nor black.
All in all, Nagarjuna says:
“The colour of my foal is neither red
nor black
nor both red and black
nor neither”
and of course everybody understands that Nagarjuna’s foal has a different colour that is not declared
I have no problem with the first three tines of the tetralemma, but the fourth is just taking the micturate. In essence, what it says is: "the existence of X cannot be talked about". Fine, but then stop talking about it so much.
Richard
21 Dec 10
Originally posted by Shallow BlueThe nature of X cannot be talked about
Erm... if your foal is another colour than red or black, it is 4. neither red nor black.
I have no problem with the first three tines of the tetralemma, but the fourth is just taking the micturate. In essence, what it says is: "the existence of X cannot be talked about". Fine, but then stop talking about it so much.
Richard
because it is not observable (by means of conceptual awareness) 😵
This way Nagarjuna ended all speculation about the so called "Ultimate Reality", discarding all kinds of "absolute truth" as a product of the collective subjectivity of the human mind alone. Methinks this is the case too regarding the "Ultimate Reality" that takes place in the quantum realm of existence: in fact, for the time being the nature of the quantum particle is unknown
😵
21 Dec 10
Seems to me you just kick the problem up one ladder by redefining existence and separating conventionally true from ultimately true.
Something being ~A and A at the same time would allow me to prove that everything is both A and ~A. I don't see how calling it classical Indian logic would have changed that.
21 Dec 10
Originally posted by PalynkaNagarjuna negates the factual separation between the "conventional" and the "ultimate truth".
Seems to me you just kick the problem up one ladder by redefining existence and separating conventionally true from ultimately true.
Something being ~A and A at the same time would allow me to prove that everything is both A and ~A. I don't see how calling it classical Indian logic would have changed that.
Nagarjuna beleived that all the philosophic and all the religious speculations on reality lead to illusion, therefore he negates all views. Nagarjuna beleives that inquiring into "ultimate causes" and purposes through philosophy is fruitless, he rejects even his own philosophical views claiming that he asserts nothing. To Nagarjuna, all concepts, including sunyata, are merely provisional and have no inherent existence on their own.
"Ultimate truth" to Nagarjuna is the product of the mind of the individual who does not mistake the conventional for something essential; and conventional reality is our common day-to-day reality that we experience by means of our senses. This conventiomal reality is grounded on the basis of the common agreement, therefore it is grounded on the basis of our collective subjectivity -and therefore the truth that derives out of it is always a relative truth based on socio-cultural factors. "Absolute Truth" is non-existent. Nagarjuna's prasanga is Nagarjuna's skilful means.
Also, since the so called "Ultimate truth" is based merely on conventional reality and not on solid metaphysics, fundamentally there is no real difference between the two realities: at first "mountains", then "no mountains", finally "mountains" again!
This way, using the classical Indian logic of the prasanga as a stepping stone, a Western Yogi could well enter his own zen, for he could use the product "being ~A" (no mountains) "and A" (mountains) "at the same time", thus he would be hopefully able to see on his own by means of his own enso that "everything is both A and ~A"
😵
21 Dec 10
Originally posted by black beetleI think my brain has been formatted not to understand these arguments.
Nagarjuna negates the factual separation between the "conventional" and the "ultimate truth".
Nagarjuna beleived that all the philosophic and all the religious speculations on reality lead to illusion, therefore he negates all views. Nagarjuna beleives that inquiring into "ultimate causes" and purposes through philosophy is fruitless, he rejects eve ...[text shortened]... own by means of his own enso that "everything is both A and ~A"
😵
Why do we need conventions or agreements? Seems logic that a man in an isolated island would have a consensus of 1, but everyone has private information of some sort so wouldn't that make commonness irrelevant and everyone would have his personal reality? What is the role of commonness/convention/agreement?
22 Dec 10
Originally posted by PalynkaEdit: "I think my brain has been formatted not to understand these arguments."
I think my brain has been formatted not to understand these arguments.
Why do we need conventions or agreements? Seems logic that a man in an isolated island would have a consensus of 1, but everyone has private information of some sort so wouldn't that make commonness irrelevant and everyone would have his personal reality? What is the role of commonness/convention/agreement?
Then I will rephrase my last sentence as following:
-- "...he would be hopefully able to see on his own by means of his own enso that
A thing is A, and at the same time ~A, and at the same time both A and ~A, and at the same time A or ~A".
These arguments are merely skilful means and have to be discarded. There is nothing to be understood but the nature of your own self.
Edit: “Why do we need conventions or agreements?”
Conventions are necessary, otherwise our society would be impossible. The main convention is language, which it is used as an interface for an 1:1 correspondence between our feelings-emotions- ideas and the objects of our 6 senses during our interaction with our physical world. We also use this interface for an 1:1 correspondence between our inner world and our ideas during our struggle to solve problems that occur either in the physical world, or in our inner world, or in the world of our ideas, or in all together or in a combination of the above worlds. In a society we live by means of mutually accepted conventions that differ because of socio-cultural differences amongst else. We drive our vehicles “safely” because we respect a code on the basis of a general agreement -and the code itself is a convention, etc etc.
Edit: “Seems logic that a man in an isolated island would have a consensus of 1, but everyone has private information of some sort so wouldn't that make commonness irrelevant and everyone would have his personal reality?”
You are aware of the fact that your car is not made of cheese merely because you observed it -you observed it by means of using your 6 senses alone. Kick a wall and you will see that your subjective feeling/ awareness is the same as every other person’s who did the same thing. Your knowledge regarding these matters is grounded on your “private information” alone, but these products of yours are also the same products as any other individual’s who acted like you and thus received the same “private information”. Therefore, although every individual has her/ his own private information, the consensus is guaranteed thanks to our collective subjectivity (that we mistakenly conceive it as objectivity).
Edit: “What is the role of commonness/convention/agreement?”
The members of the team can react on the spot at any given time during an alarm, like the balls on the surface of the table that they will all roll down once the table is semi-raised at an angle
😵
22 Dec 10
Originally posted by black beetleThank you for that further explanation. Informative. So he is not confused in relation to his own reference points, but confused or un-informed about the classical Indian approach to logic, and Nagarjuna's intention, if I have it correctly.
Nagarjuna doesn’t use the Aristotlean approach -Mulamadhyamakakarika is not based on the Western but on the classical Indian logic. In the Western logical traditions there are two main possibilities in an argument, truth or falsity, although a Western logician will often try to prove another truth through negation.
However, Indian traditions use four p ...[text shortened]... logic these four statements are incompatible with each other blah blah blah”, oh the horror
😵